Trial—Statute Prescribing Rules for Directing Verdict Assumption of Judicial Power by Legislature by unknown
Washington University Law Review 
Volume 9 Issue 2 
January 1924 
Trial—Statute Prescribing Rules for Directing Verdict Assumption 
of Judicial Power by Legislature 
Follow this and additional works at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Trial—Statute Prescribing Rules for Directing Verdict Assumption of Judicial Power by Legislature, 9 ST. 
LOUIS L. REV. 155 (1924). 
Available at: https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol9/iss2/14 
This Comment on Recent Decisions is brought to you for free and open access by the Law School at Washington 
University Open Scholarship. It has been accepted for inclusion in Washington University Law Review by an 
authorized administrator of Washington University Open Scholarship. For more information, please contact 
digital@wumail.wustl.edu. 
REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS 155
articles provided that "each faction hereby binds and obligates itself to abide
by and be guided by the finding of said board."
Appellants declined to abide by the award for several assigned reasons,
among them being that the board of arbitration did not decide the first two
of three questions submitted and which appellants insist were the basis of the
answer to and decision of the third question.
The controversy was finally carried to the district association of the church
where all matters were heard and it was determined by that body that appellees,
acting as trustees, and the faction which they represented were the true trus-
tees and congregation.
The court held that this action in most church congregations, in the absence
of anything to the contrary, would be conclusive, the rules of the church being
supreme in such matters, citing Poynter v. Phelps, 129 Ky. 381.
That the award was not void or ineffectual in so far as it decided and
determined any of the questions submited to the board of arbitration.
That the award of the board was much more favorable to the appellants
than was their right, and, that the appellees having generously accepted the
award, that the appellants had no grounds to complain and affirmed the judg-
ment of the lower court sustaining the award.
TRIAL-STATUTE PRESCRIBING RULES FOR DIRECTING VERDICT
ASSUMPTION OF JUDICIAL POWER BY LEGISLATURE.
The Supreme Court of Wisconsin in the recent case of Thoe v. Chicago,
31. and St. P. Ry. Co., 195 N. W. 407, held a statute, which prohibited the
court from directing a verdict after the jury had been selected, to be uncon-
stitutional as an unauthorized assumption of the judicial power by the legis-
lature. The case involved a suit to recover damages for the death of the
deceased. The evidence was clearly insufficient as a matter of law to sus-
tain a verdict for the plaintiff.
In passing on the statute which prohibited the direction of a verdict, the
court said, page 410: "If the power to determine the legal sufficiency of the
evidence is a judicial power, then the legislature has exercised that power by
determining in every case that the legal sufficiency of the evidence is to go to
the jury. If this does not constitute a clear exercise of judicial power, it is
difficult to imagine a case where the judicial power can be invaded." The
legislature attempts to interpose the statute where the courts have had power
to act from time immemorial, i. e., to direct a verdict at the close of the testi-
mony if the evidence cannot from any point of view support a verdict for the
adverse party.
The court went on to deny the right of the legislature to declare in advance
that evidence is sufficient. Its sufficiency is purely a judicial matter for the
court. The fact that even though the trial court is prohibited from directing
a verdict, an unwarranted verdict of the jury can be corrected at a subsequent
time in the proceedings cannot affect the constitutionality of the statute. An
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infraction, of the constitutio is to be measured by its character and not by its
size.
The SuPeree C Qvts of both North Dakota and Minnesota have arrived,
apparently, 4t opposite co clusimn, to that of the Wisconsim Court. The case of
Zimintiwrwx W. Chicaga, acd N. W. Rv. Co., 129 Mim. 4, involved the constitu-
tionality of a statute which prohibited the direction of a verdict by the court
at the close of thft testimony if the opposite party objected. The court held that
the steute, was valid. and was merely a regulation of procedure as the effect
of an impropei, verdict could, be cormcted subsequently in: the case.
A statute of North Dakota in exactly the same wording as the Minnesota
statut& waes upbel in, the case of First National Bank v. Straus.7, 194 N. W.
900: In this case the direction. of a verdict by the court over the objection of
the adverse party was hold, to be. evror. The court: does- not: discuss its reasons
for. 49holding a vid the statute but seems to assume its- validity. Neither
does the Minnesota court. in the above cited case fully consider the question
of. th.e validity of that. statute except, as above- stated, in briefly passing over
it to declaro it a. regulation of procedure.
Sipce the-submission of a case to a jury implies that the evidence is sufficient
to sustain a verdict for either party, and in view of, the fact that the determina-
tion of that sufficiency is a purely judicial matter, the Wisconsin doctrine seems
supported by the better reasoning. The effect of such a statute is more than
a mere regulation of procedure; it creates a presumption of the sufficiency of
the evidew,,e which is. a judicial matter only, and therefore invades the judicial
field. The legislative branch of the government has no right to do this in the
absence of constitutional authority.
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